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Biosecurity and quarantine

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Ratification Date: 11 Dec 2024

Policy

  1. Australia should have strong biosecurity and quarantine policies and effective strategies to protect animal health and welfare, public health and the environment. 
  2. The welfare of individual animals undergoing quarantine must be ensured.
  3. Consultation with veterinarians with species-specific expertise is essential to ensure optimal management of biosecurity risks as well as the health and welfare needs of animals in quarantine.

Background

Biosecurity in Australia is a shared responsibility. Veterinarians, due to their technical expertise, have an essential role to play in the design, operation and review of quarantine facilities and processes, as well as in the development of strategic policies and biosecurity risk assessments.

To be effective, biosecurity policies and strategies must:

  • protect Australia's favourable pest and disease status by minimising the risk of entry of exotic diseases and pests into the country;
  • protect animal health and welfare, public health and the environment, and maintain access to international markets for animal products;
  • meet Australia’s international obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health and the World Health Organization;
  • provide for open and transparent consultation with stakeholders during their development and implementation;
  • ensure appropriate infrastructure to deal with exotic disease incursions;
  • support continuing education of all veterinarians to ensure they remain up to date with current biosecurity recommendations and practices;
  • address and mitigate the risks to animal welfare for animals undergoing quarantine, and the impacts on their owners and carers during the quarantine process.

On 16 June 2016 the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) came into force. This legislation replaced the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) which had regulated biosecurity in Australia for over a century. Impetus for the change arose from a number of reviews into Australia’s biosecurity system (the Nairn Committee Report, 1996, and later Beale Review, 2008). These reports identified systemic flaws that were causing the country to be vulnerable to incursions of foreign pests and diseases through the administration of an out-dated regulatory regime.

The Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) includes new terminology, increased powers for the regulator and additional requirements for industry (Durant and Faunce, 2018).

The Australian Veterinary Association (AVA) endorses the risk-based approach of the Biosecurity Act 2015, particularly the principles of:

  • allowing the entry of animals, their reproductive material and animal products, consistent with safety to agriculture and the environment, and adopting a conservative approach to risk;
  • the biosecurity continuum’ – i.e. managing risks pre-border, at the border and post-border.

Recommendations

  1. The AVA supports the need for a structured, comprehensive and consultative process for risk analysis to ensure a robust biosecurity system. AVA advocates continued improvement in the methods used for risk assessment in line with current science and evidence to ensure that import policy remains current, science-based and leads to appropriate risk management measures. AVA supports ongoing and iterative risk communication with all stakeholders to maintain an open and robust process.
  2. Australian animal health authorities must maintain a close relationship with key trading partners to ensure accurate and current intelligence on pest and disease risks.
  3. AVA supports Australian animal health authorities undertaking offshore pre-border monitoring and surveillance, and assisting in capacity building, particularly in the Asia–Pacific region, to help identify emerging pest and disease risks and to reduce the risk of incursions of exotic pests and diseases.
  4. AVA also endorses the need for Australian animal health authorities to engage with and influence international agencies that set standards for animal health and trade in animals and animal products.
  5. AVA supports the continued development of the National Animal Health Information System (NAHIS) to improve the quality of information provided for international disease reporting and to enhance Australia’s trade position.
  6. Australia must maintain and continuously review preparedness plans (e.g. AUSVETPLAN) for incursions of exotic pests and diseases and for outbreaks of emerging and endemic emergency animal diseases (whether well-established diseases such as anthrax, or newly recognised emerging diseases such as Japanese encephalitis virus).
  7. Australian government veterinarians, state/territory government veterinarians and accredited private practitioners must be kept at an educational and skill level that is adequate to deal with outbreaks. Relevant infrastructure, such as veterinary laboratories, animal health monitoring and surveillance, and training in emergency animal disease responses must be maintained at levels sufficient to ensure outbreaks of emergency animal diseases are rapidly detected and appropriately controlled and eradicated where possible.

Animals in quarantine facilities

  1. The welfare needs of animals in quarantine must be a high priority. Animals are sentient and may suffer from stress, anxiety or boredom during their period of quarantine. Provision of a standard of care in line with the principles of the Five Domains is important, including provision of mental and physical stimulation.
  2. Private veterinarians who attend to animals in quarantine facilities must be enabled to provide a level of care which they deem appropriate, and which allows them to meet their responsibilities to their patients.
  3. Companion animals have well established relationships with their human families, so accommodation which allows maintenance of the human-animal bond through visitations is desirable for the welfare of both parties.
  4. There should be proactive consideration of potential health and welfare impacts prior to entrance into quarantine. For example:
  1. vaccination against common infectious diseases is not consistently required for animals entering post-entry quarantine facilities in Australia.  It is recommended that vaccination should become mandatory and that veterinarians are consulted on development of the relevant protocols.
  2. long haired dog and cat breeds may benefit from clipping prior to entering the facility, or, where this is not desired by the owner, regular grooming by professional groomers should be permitted during the animal’s stay and at the owner’s expense.

References

  1. Australian Government. AQIS. Nairn Committee. (1996) Australian Quarantine: A Shared Responsibility. http://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity/australia/reports-pubs/nairn/govt-response Accessed October 2019
  2. Animal Health Australia. National Animal Health Information System. https://nahis.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/public.php?page=pub_home&program=1
  3. Special report: review of Australian quarantine and Biosecurity ('Beale review'). http://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity/australia/biosecurity-reform/reform-biosecurity-system
  4. Durant, Sam and Faunce, Thomas Alured, Analysis of Australia's New Biosecurity Legislation (August 30, 2018). Durant S and Faunce TA Analysis of Australia’s New Biosecurity Legislation (2018) 25 (3) JLM 647-654, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3241819